Name: Janaína Rosa da Silva
Type: MSc dissertation
Publication date: 10/07/2017
Advisor:
Name |
Role |
|---|---|
| Marcelo Martins Barreira | Advisor * |
Examining board:
| Name |
Role |
|---|---|
| Adna Candido de Paula | External Examiner * |
| Barbara Botter | Internal Alternate * |
| Ivanhoé Leal Albuquerque | External Alternate * |
| Marcelo Martins Barreira | Advisor * |
| Thana Mara de Souza | Internal Examiner * |
Summary: This research aims to investigate the paradox of the problem of evil, which alienates freedom through freedom itself. Since S. Agostinho, philosophy has removed the idea of a nature of evil as a being, as a thing, which, on the one hand, led the understanding of evil to the field of the imperfection of human nature. Modern philosophy places freedom as the central point of discussions around the origin of evil action, especially Descartes, Kant and Hegel. However, imputability and guilt show the limit of the autonomy of the sovereign subject, since the subject is both capable of good and capable of evil. In order to understand the paradoxical relation between evil, freedom and the capable subject ricoeurian, this investigation begins with Ricoeur's Philosophy of Will, in an attempt to show how the capable subject is placed in opposition to the sovereign subject to from the weakness of the will in the face of evil. Then, from the long hermeneutic way as a form of interpretation, we seek to understand the meaning of hermeneutical theory of symbols and myths, transmitted by the ancient Babylonian, Jewish and Christian cultures, in the works Symbolic of Evil (1960) and The Conflict of Interpretations (1969). The relation between evil and freedom in Ricoeur has its genesis in direct dialogue with the problem of radical evil and the free will of Kantian philosophy. In the face of the subject ricoeurian who wants, a being is revealed that brings a subject of powers through the mysterious subjectivity constituted between body and thought. This able subject is criticized by Levinas with the theory of absolute alterity, which is opposed to the Ricoeurian subjectivity of self-understanding. In the course of our investigation, we note that the subject of powers of Ricoeur, although clothed with a paradox, has the merit of empowering the human being as agent, an agent responsible for his actions. The study of the performative character of freedom without recourse to transcendence led Ricoeur to seek to rescue forgiveness as a way of restoring alienated freedom.
