Name: Vinícius Francisco Apolinário
Type: MSc dissertation
Publication date: 15/02/2023
Advisor:
Name |
Role |
|---|---|
| José Renato Salatiel | Advisor * |
Examining board:
| Name |
Role |
|---|---|
| Eros Moreira de Carvalho | External Examiner * |
| Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho | External Examiner * |
| Jorge Luiz Viesenteiner | Internal Alternate * |
| Ricardo Corrêa de Araujo | Internal Alternate * |
Summary: The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the epistemic debate about the relation between
sensory experience and empirical beliefs, that is, the discussion about how perceptual content
relates to the content of beliefs. We conduct this analysis around the problem of the justification
of empirical beliefs, based on two debates. One, of historical character, which provides the
context for the debate, starting from the dispute between foundationalism and coherentism
about the justification of knowledge. Another, of thematic character, in which conceptualists
and non-conceptualists attempt to defend different positions on the nature of perceptual content
and, based on this, its epistemological consequences. Our conclusion, having considered the
main arguments mentioned in this debate, is in favor of the non-conceptualist thesis, more
specifically, the scenario-content thesis as the appropriate model of perceptual content. On this
basis, we consider that perception is a non-conceptual form of representation and does not need
to maintain inferential relations with propositional attitudes; it is the basis of conceptual
acquisition and development; it is a type of mental content shared by human adults and nonlinguistic creatures (infants and non-human animals); finally, it is a more informational rich
kind of representation than conceptually structured states. We have suggested, finally, that the
appropriate relationship between belief and perception is a non-inferential one. We proposed
that the epistemic role of perception is to be the basis of application of empirical concepts,
bringing non-conceptualism closer to epistemological externalism.
